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 91 
THE (UN?)CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COMPELLING NON-
IMMUNIZED TESTIMONY IN DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES 
INVESTIGATIONS CONDUCTED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF 




I.  AN OVERVIEW OF ARKANSAS’S PROHIBITION ON DECEPTIVE TRADE 
PRACTICES 
On January 11, 1971, the Arkansas General Assembly convened for its 
sixty-eighth regular session.1 During this session, the legislature determined 
that “the public health, welfare, and interest require[d] a strong and effective 
consumer protection program to protect the interests of both the consumer 
public and the legitimate business community.”2 
To accomplish this end, the legislature approved an act to prohibit de-
ceptive trade practices, which the legislature defined as including, but not 
limited to the following: 
(a) Knowingly making a false representation as to the characteristics, in-
gredients, uses, benefits, alterations, source, sponsorship, approval or 
certification of goods or services, or as to whether goods are original or 
new, or of a particular standard, quality, grade, style, or model. 
(b) Disparaging the goods, services, or business of another by [a] false or 
misleading representation of fact. 
(c) Advertising goods or services with [the] intent not to sell them as ad-
vertised. 
(d) [The] [r]efusal of a retailer to deliver to the customer purchasing any 
electronic or mechanical apparatus the record of warranty and statement 
of service availability [that] the manufacturer includes in the original car-
ton or container of the product, or the refusal to make available, on re-
quest, information relating thereto. 
(e) The employment of “bait and switch” advertising, consisting of an at-
tractive but insincere offer to sell a product or service [that] the seller in 
truth does not intend or desire to sell, evidenced by refusal to show or 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock William H. Bowen 
School of Law. 
 1. 1971 Ark. Acts, vol. 2, bk. 1, p. i. The session adjourned on April 19, 1971. 
 2. 1971 Ark. Acts, vol. 2, bk. 1, p. 257–58. 
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[disparagement] of the advertised product, requirement of tie-in sale or 
other undisclosed conditions precedent to the purchase, demonstrating a 
defective product, or other acts demonstrating an intent not to sell the 
advertised product or services. 
(f) Knowingly failing to identify flood, water, fire, or accidentally dam-
aged goods as to such damages.
3 
In addition to the foregoing, the act declared the following to be unlaw-
ful practices: 
The act, use or employment by any person of any deception, fraud, or 
false pretense; or the concealment, suppression, or omission of any mate-
rial fact with [the] intent that others rely upon such concealment, sup-
pression or omission; in connection with the sale or advertisement of any 
goods or services . . . .
4
 
Contriv[ing], prepar[ing], set[ting] up, propos[ing], or operat[ing] any 
pyramiding device.
5 
The act took effect on July 1, 1971,6 and is commonly known as the 
Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA) or the Deceptive Trade 
Practices Act (DTPA).7 
The DTPA empowers the Attorney General of the State of Arkansas to 
conduct an investigation under the following circumstances: (1) when the 
 
 3. Act of July 1, 1971, No. 92, 1971 Ark. Acts 92 at sec. 6 (codified at ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 4-88-107 (Repl. 2011)). 
 4. Id. at sec. 4 (codified at ARK CODE ANN. § 4-88-108 (Repl. 2011)). 
 5. Id. at sec. 5 (codified at Ark Code Ann. § 4-88-109 (Repl. 2011)). The act defined a 
“pyramiding device” as: 
any scheme for the disposal or distribution of property whereby a participant 
pays valuable consideration for the chance to receive compensation for introduc-
ing one or more additional persons into participation in the scheme or for the 
chance to receive compensation when a person introduced by the participant in-
troduces a new participant.  
Id. 
 6. Id. at sec. 15. 
 7. The legislature did not actually name the act. The phrase “Arkansas Deceptive Trade 
Practices Act” first appeared in a published judicial decision on March 11, 1991 in Lemarco, 
Inc. v. Wood, 305 Ark. 1, 2, 804 S.W.2d 724, 725 (1991). The phrases “Arkansas Deceptive 
Trade Practices Act” and the “Deceptive Trade Practices Act” likely derived from where the 
act is codified in the Arkansas Code Annotated, which is Title 4, Subtitle 7, Chapter 88, and 
is entitled “Deceptive Trade Practices.” Act 92 of 1971 is currently codified at Arkansas 
Code Annotated sections 4-88-101 through 4-88-109 and 4-88-111 through 4-88-115. Act 92 
of 1971 did not, however, create sections 4-88-102, 4-88-114, or 4-88-115. 1971 Ark. Acts 
92, at secs. 1–15. The General Assembly enacted section 4-88-102 in Act 1177 of 1991, sec. 
3; it enacted section 4-88-114 in Act 587 of 1993, sec. 5; and it enacted section 4-88-115 in 
Act 910 of 1993, sec. 2. 
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Attorney General determines that an investigation should be made as to 
whether a person has engaged in, is engaging in, or shows an intent to en-
gage in a deceptive trade practice; (2) when the Attorney General receives a 
request to enforce the DTPA from a consumer organization, a labor organi-
zation, a better business bureau, a chamber of commerce, or a state agency; 
and (3) when the Attorney General receives a written complaint from a con-
sumer asserting a violation of Arkansas’s prohibition on deceptive trade 
practices.8 
In the course of conducting an investigation under the DTPA, the At-
torney General is authorized to require the target of the investigation to “file 
a statement or [written report regarding] the facts and circumstances [of] the 
matter [being investigated,]”9 and to “examine under oath or take the deposi-
tion of [the target of the investigation].”10 
Evidence produced as a result of the target filing a statement or written 
report, or as a result of the target giving a deposition, can be used in a later 
judicial proceeding by the Attorney General or by any attorney designated 
by the Attorney General.11 
If the Attorney General demands that a person file a statement, written 
report, or appear for a deposition and that person refuses or fails to do so, 
the Attorney General can file a petition in the circuit court of the county 
where the person resides or in the Circuit Court of Pulaski County and re-
quest an order to compel the person’s compliance.12 An order granting or 
denying the Attorney General’s petition can be appealed to the Supreme 
Court of Arkansas.13 
If the Attorney General’s investigation leads him or her to conclude 
that the target of the investigation has engaged in, is engaging in, or shows 
an intent to engage in a deceptive trade practice, the Attorney General can 
file a civil enforcement action in the circuit court of the county where the 
target resides or in the Circuit Court of Pulaski County and ask that the court 
enter an order preventing the target from engaging in any deceptive trade 
practices.14 
The court can order that restitution be paid to purchasers who suffer 
losses as a result of the use or employment of deceptive trade practices,15 
and the court can impose a monetary penalty of $10,000 per violation 
 
 8. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-111(a) (Repl. 2011). 
 9. Id. § 4-88-111(a)(1). 
 10. Id. § 4-88-111(a)(2). 
 11. Id. § 4-88-111(c). 
 12. Id. § 4-88-112(a). 
 13. Id. § 4-88-112(d). 
 14. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-113(a)(1) (Repl. 2011). 
 15. Id. § 4-88-113(a)(2)(A). 
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against the person or entity found to have violated the DTPA.16 If the Attor-
ney General asks the court to do so, it can suspend or forfeit the franchise, 
corporate charter, license, permit, or authorization to do business in the State 
of Arkansas of a violator of the DTPA.17 
If the Attorney General prevails in a civil enforcement action under the 
DTPA, the losing party is required to pay the costs the Attorney General 
incurred in investigating the matter and prosecuting the civil enforcement 
action.18 The losing party is also required to pay the Attorney General’s at-
torneys’ fees.19 In addition to civil penalties, a person who is found to be a 
violator of the DTPA is also guilty of a Class A misdemeanor, which sub-
jects that person to a fine of up to $2,500 and a prison term of up to one 
year.20 
II.  THE FIFTH AMENDMENT ISSUE 
The Attorney General is authorized to enforce the DTPA, which in-
cludes the power to compel the target of a DTPA investigation to provide 
testimonial evidence that can be used against that person in a post-
investigation criminal proceeding.21 A violation of the DTPA is a crime,22 
yet, the Attorney General is not authorized to prosecute crimes.23 This 
means that the Attorney General can compel the target of a DTPA investiga-
tion to provide testimony that can be used against that person in a subse-
 
 16. Id. § 4-88-113(a)(3). 
 17. Id. § 4-88-113(b). 
 18. Id. § 4-88-113(e). 
 19. Id. § 4-88-113(e). 
 20. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-103 (a person who knowingly and willfully commits a 
violation of the DTPA is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-201(b)(1) 
(Supp. 2013) (a person convicted of a Class A misdemeanor may be required to pay a fine 
not exceeding $2,500); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-401(b)(1) (a person convicted of a Class A 
misdemeanor may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment not to exceed one year). 
 21. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-88-104; 4-88-111; 4-88-113 (Repl. 2011). 
 22. Id. § 4-88-103. 
 23. ARK. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1 (“All offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by 
indictment may be prosecuted either by indictment by a grand jury or information filed by the 
Prosecuting Attorney.”) (emphasis added); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-21-103 (Repl. 1999) 
(“Each prosecuting attorney shall commence and prosecute all criminal actions in which the 
state or any county in his district may be concerned.”) (emphasis added); ARK. CODE ANN. § 
25-16-702 (Repl. 2002) (listing the duties of the Attorney General). Prosecuting attorneys 
have the discretion to delegate their authority to prosecute state misdemeanor laws to the city 
attorneys in whose municipality the misdemeanors occur. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-21-115 
(Supp. 2013) (emphasis added). The city attorneys, however, have to consent to the delega-
tion of that authority. Id. Prosecuting attorneys cannot prosecute city misdemeanor cases or 
appeals to circuit court or to the Supreme Court of Arkansas or the Arkansas Court of Ap-
peals unless they consent to do so. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-21-150 (Repl. 1999). 
2014] COMPELLING NON-IMMUNIZED TESTIMONY 95 
quent criminal prosecution, which in turn raises the question of whether that 
authority violates the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 
Because the Attorney General lacks the authority to prosecute criminal 
cases, that office likewise lacks the authority to grant a person immunity 
from a criminal prosecution.24 Notwithstanding the Attorney General’s ina-
bility to grant a person immunity from a criminal prosecution, the DTPA 
authorizes that office to compel a person to give self-incriminating testimo-
ny, and because a violation of the DTPA is a civil as well as a criminal of-
fense, that testimony can be used in a criminal prosecution that comes on the 
heels of a civil enforcement action.25 
This issue has not been addressed by the Supreme Court of Arkansas or 
the Arkansas Court of Appeals. This essay will now examine whether the 
Attorney General’s authority to compel a person who is the target of a 
DTPA investigation to give non-immunized self-incriminating testimony 
violates the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 
III.  ANALYSIS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT ISSUE 
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of 
America states: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in 
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual 
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject 
for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall 
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 




The Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination is binding 
on the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.27 Although the text of the Fifth Amendment mentions only criminal 
cases, the privilege to refuse to give self-incriminating testimony can be 
asserted in any proceeding, be it civil, criminal, administrative, judicial, 
investigatory, or adjudicatory, and it allows a witness to refuse to disclose 
any testimonial evidence that he reasonably believes might be used in a 
criminal prosecution or that might lead to other evidence that could be used 
 
 24. ARK. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1; ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-16-702 (Repl. 2002). 
 25. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-88-103, -104, -111, -113 (Repl. 2011). 
 26. U.S. CONST. amend V (emphasis added). 
 27. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 4–6 (1964). 
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in a criminal prosecution.28 The privilege protects non-party witnesses and 
party witnesses alike.29 In sum, a person may properly invoke the Fifth 
Amendment in any proceeding where any testimony he might give might be 
used against him in a later criminal proceeding.30 
The privilege does not apply, however, in a proceeding where a person 
is assured that his testimony will not be used against him in a later criminal 
proceeding.31 A witness can be compelled to give self-incriminating testi-
mony in any proceeding if prior to giving the testimony, it has been immun-
ized from use and derivative use32 in a future criminal proceeding.33 A wit-
ness must insist on an immunity agreement before being compelled to give 
incriminating testimony in a noncriminal case in order to preserve the Fifth 
Amendment right to prohibit the use of that compelled testimony in a subse-
quent criminal case.34 
If a witness fails to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege when he is 
entitled to do so, he forfeits his right to bar the use of any self-incriminating 
evidence in a later criminal prosecution.35 It is necessary, therefore, for a 
witness to assert his privilege before a criminal prosecution takes place in 
 
 28. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444–45 (1972). If a witness invokes his 
Fifth Amendment right in a civil case, the fact finder is allowed to draw an adverse inference 
against the witness. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 328 (1999) (citing Lefkowitz v. 
Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 808, n.5 (1977); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318, 319 
(1976)). In a criminal case, however, the Fifth Amendment prohibits the drawing of an ad-
verse inference against a witness who invokes his right to remain silent. Baxter, 425 U.S. 
308, 318–19 (1976) (citing Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 612–15 (1965)). The privilege 
operates differently in civil cases than it does in criminal cases because the stakes are higher 
for a witness in a criminal case than they are in a civil case. Baxter, 425 U.S. at 318–19. In a 
criminal case, a witness stands to lose his life or liberty; not so in a civil case. Id. 
 29. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973) (citing McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 
U.S. 34, 40 (1924)). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 78 (citing Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 443–59). 
 32. “Use” or “derivative use” immunity bars the government from using compelled 
testimony and any evidence derived from that testimony against the witness. Kastigar, 406 
U.S. at 443. Use or derivative use immunity does not prohibit a witness from being prosecut-
ed in a later criminal proceeding if the government has independent evidence to convict the 
witness of a crime about which he testified. United States v. Quatermain, 467 F. Supp. 782, 
787–88 (E.D. Pa. 1979). “Transactional” immunity, on the other hand, prevents the govern-
ment from prosecuting a witness for any offense to which his compelled testimony relates. 
Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 443. Transactional immunity is broader than use immunity; in fact, 
transactional immunity includes within it, use immunity. United States v. Pellon, 475 F. 
Supp. 467, 478–79 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (citing Quatermain, 467 F. Supp. at 788). 
 33. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 770–71 (2003) (citing Maness v. Myers, 419 U.S. 
449, 461–62 (1975); Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453). 
 34. Chavez, 538 U.S. at 771 (citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 440–41 (1974)). 
 35. Id. (citing Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 440 (1984); Garner v. United States, 
424 U.S. 648, 650 (1976); United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 7 (1970)). 
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order to preserve the privilege.36 This means that a witness must insist on, 
and be granted, immunity before he gives testimony if he wants to bar the 
government from using the testimony in a later criminal prosecution.37 
As discussed above, the Attorney General has the authority to investi-
gate alleged violations of the DTPA and to prosecute civil enforcement ac-
tions under the DTPA.38 If the Attorney General prevails in a civil enforce-
ment action, then the defendant is guilty of violating the DTPA, which in 
turn means the defendant is guilty of a criminal offense and subject to crim-
inal prosecution.39 The Attorney General, however, is not authorized to con-
duct that prosecution and lacks the authority to grant a person immunity 
from such a prosecution.40 Despite not having the authority to prosecute a 
criminal case or the authority to grant immunity from a criminal prosecu-
tion, the Attorney General can compel the target of a DTPA investigation to 
give non-immunized self-incriminating testimony that could very well be 
used in a later criminal prosecution of that person.41 The Fifth Amendment, 
however, disallows such a thing.42 
Because the Attorney General cannot grant a person immunity from a 
criminal prosecution, and because the DTPA authorizes a criminal prosecu-
tion of a person found to have violated the DTPA, the Attorney General’s 
authority to compel the target of a DTPA investigation to offer non-
immunized testimonial evidence is unconstitutional.43 The law is clearly 
established that the government can compel self-incriminating testimony 
only if the witness is granted immunity before giving the testimony.44 Be-
cause the DTPA allows the Attorney General to compel non-immunized 
self-incriminating testimony in DTPA investigations, Arkansas law is con-
trary to well established Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.45 
This issue, however, has not been decided by the Supreme Court of 
Arkansas or the Arkansas Court of Appeals. In order to put the thesis of this 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 771–72. 
 38. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-88-104, 4-88-111 (2011). 
 39. Id. § 4-88-103. 
 40. ARK. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1; ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-16-702 (Repl. 2002). 
 41. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-88-111(a)(1)–(2), (c) (2011). 
 42. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 770–71 (2003) (citing Maness v. Myers, 419 U.S. 
449, 461–62 (1975); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972)). 
 43. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 441 (1974) (testimony obtained in civil suits, 
or before administrative or legislative committees can prove so incriminating that a person 
compelled to give such testimony might readily be convicted on the basis of those disclosures 
in a subsequent criminal proceeding). 
 44. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77–78 (1973) (citing Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 443–
59). 
 45. See Chavez, 538 U.S. at 770–71 (citing Maness, 419 U.S. at 461–62; Kastigar, 406 
U.S. at 453). 
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essay to the test, the target of a DTPA investigation has to disobey a demand 
from the Attorney General to provide testimonial evidence, which will then 
cause the Attorney General to file a petition in the relevant circuit court ask-
ing for a court order compelling the non-compliant target to provide testi-
monial evidence.46 Once such a petition is filed, the target will then need to 
file a motion for a declaratory judgment47 that Arkansas Code Annotated 
sections 4-88-111(a)(1), (2), and 4-88-111(c) violate the Fifth Amendment 
right against self-incrimination. 
No matter how the circuit court rules on the motion for a declaratory 
judgment, the losing party would almost certainly appeal the court’s ruling 
to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, and that court will then provide Arkan-
sas’s answer to the question of whether the Attorney General’s authority to 
compel non-immunized testimonial evidence from the target of a DTPA 
investigation violates the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. That, however, might not be the end of the matter. Because 
this issue involves federal constitutional law, a decision by the Supreme 
Court of Arkansas on the issue can be presented to the Supreme Court of the 
United States in a petition for a writ of certiorari.48 
On the other hand, if the Supreme Court of Arkansas decides that the 
Attorney General’s authority to compel non-immunized testimonial evi-
dence from the target of a DTPA investigation does not violate the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and the losing party does 
not seek review in the Supreme Court of the United States, if that party is 
then prosecuted, he will need to raise the Fifth Amendment issue in the 
criminal trial, and if he is convicted, then he will need to raise it again in the 
direct appeal of his conviction. 
Of course, given that the Supreme Court of Arkansas will have already 
decided that the challenged practice does not violate the Fifth Amendment, 
the defendant will lose that issue on direct appeal. Once the decision on di-
rect appeal is final, however, the defendant can present the Fifth Amend-
ment question to a United States district court in a petition for a writ of ha-
beas corpus.49 The United States district court will then declare that the chal-
lenged practice violates the Fifth Amendment or that it does not. Either way, 
the losing side of that question can ask the district court to issue a certificate 
 
 46. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-112 (2011). 
 47. Arkansas’s declaratory judgment procedure can be found at Arkansas Code Anno-
tated, sections 16-111-101 through 16-111-111 (Supp. 2013). 
 48. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-111(a)(1)-(2), (c) (2011); SUP. CT. R. 10(c) (the Su-
preme Court can grant a petition for a writ of certiorari in a case where a state court decides 
an important question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by the Supreme 
Court, or decides an important federal question in a way that conflicts with relevant decisions 
of the Court). 
 49. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d), 2254(a), (d)(1) (1996). 
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of appealability in order to present the question to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.50 The Eighth Circuit will then rule on the 
question, and the losing side of that argument can petition the Supreme 
Court of the United States to decide the question.51 
IV.  POSSIBLE CURES FOR THE FIFTH AMENDMENT PROBLEM 
There are at least two ways to cure the Fifth Amendment self-
incrimination problem implicated by the DTPA. One way is for the Arkan-
sas General Assembly to repeal Arkansas Code Annotated section 4-88-103, 
which is the part of the DTPA that criminalizes deceptive trade practices. 
Repealing section 4-88-103 would remove the Fifth Amendment issue alto-
gether because that would eliminate the prospect of a criminal prosecution 
following an admission or judicial finding that a person violated the DTPA. 
If there is no prospect of a criminal prosecution, the Fifth Amendment does 
not stand in the way of the Attorney General compelling a person to provide 
non-immunized self-incriminating testimony.52 
There are sound reasons to repeal section 4-88-103. First, doing so will 
not undermine the enforcement of the DTPA because the absence of a crim-
inal provision in the DTPA will not vitiate any of the Attorney General’s 
enforcement prerogatives in any other part of the law. The Attorney General 
will still have the right to file a lawsuit and ask a court to stop a person from 
engaging in deceptive trade practices, make whole those who incurred a 
monetary loss as the result of deceptive trade practices, impose a fine of 
$10,000 against a person found in violation of the DTPA, and terminate a 
person’s ability to conduct business in the State of Arkansas because of vio-
lations of the DTPA.53 
Second, the monetary civil penalties for violating the DTPA are sub-
stantially more severe than the monetary criminal penalties.54 The monetary 
criminal penalty for violating the DTPA is a fine of up to $2,500,55 which 
 
 50. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (1996); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 337 (2003); 
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 (1983). 
 51. SUP. CT. R. 10(c) (the Supreme Court can grant a petition for a writ of certiorari in a 
case where a United States circuit court decides an important question of federal law that has 
not been, but should be, settled by the Supreme Court, or decides an important federal ques-
tion in a way that conflicts with relevant decisions of the Court). 
 52. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 441 (1972) (the right against self-
incrimination does not apply in a proceeding where a person is assured that his testimony will 
not be used against him in a later criminal proceeding). 
 53. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-113(a)(1)–(3), (b). 
 54. See id. § 4-88-103 (a person who knowingly and willfully commits a violation of the 
DTPA is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor); Id. § 5-4-201(b)(1) (a person convicted of a 
Class A misdemeanor may be required to pay a fine not exceeding $2,500). 
 55. See id. §§ 4-88-103, 5-4-201(b)(1). 
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means that a person found in violation of the DTPA could be convicted of a 
crime, yet not be required to pay a criminal fine at all. And even if a person 
received the maximum fine of $2,500, that is only 25% of the $10,000 max-
imum civil penalty that a court could assess in a civil enforcement proceed-
ing under the DTPA.56 
Third, the criminal provision of the DTPA has been in effect since July 
1, 1971,57 yet as of the writing of this essay,58 there is not one reported deci-
sion of the Supreme Court of Arkansas, the Arkansas Court of Appeals, or 
any other court where a conviction under that provision is an issue, which 
means the law is probably not being used anyway. This is not to say that no 
one has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a section 4-88-103 charge in 
the more than forty-three years since the law been in effect, but it certainly 
appears that way from the publicly available sources. 
A second way to cure the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination problem 
implicated by the DTPA is for the Arkansas General Assembly to enact a 
statute that gives the Attorney General the authority to grant a person im-
munity from criminal prosecution.59 There are at least two reasons, however, 
why this is a significantly more complicated solution than a repeal of section 
4-88-103. 
First, authorizing the Attorney General to grant a person immunity 
from criminal prosecution means that that office will also need the authority 
to prosecute criminal cases. Currently, the authority to prosecute criminal 
cases in Arkansas rests with its twenty-seven elected prosecuting attorneys,60 
 
 56. Id. § 4-88-113(a)(3) (a court can assess a fine of up to $10,000 per violation of the 
DTPA). 
 57. Act of July 1, 1971, No. 92, 1971 Ark. Act 92 at sec. 4 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. 
§ 4-88-103). 
 58. The author of this essay wrote it in late July 2014 and early August 2014. 
 59. The Office of Attorney General is a constitutional office, but the duties of the office 
are defined by the General Assembly. See Newton Cnty. v. West, 293 Ark. 461, 466, 739 
S.W.2d 141, 144 (1987) (citing Parker v. Murry, 221 Ark. 554, 559, 254 S.W.2d 468, 471 
(1953)). 
 60. ARK. CONST. amend. 21, § 1; ARK. CONST. amend 80, § 20. Arkansas’s prosecuting 
attorneys are elected to four year terms from twenty-seven legislatively created judicial dis-
tricts. ARK. CONST. amend 80, § 20; ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-901 (the First Judicial District, 
which consists of the counties of Cross, Lee, Monroe, Phillips, St. Francis, and Woodruff); 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-1001 (the Second Judicial District, which consists of the counties 
of Clay, Craighead, Crittenden, Greene, Mississippi, and Poinsett); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-
1101 (the Third Judicial District, which consists of the counties of Jackson, Lawrence, Ran-
dolph, and Sharp); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-1201 (the Fourth Judicial District, which con-
sists of the counties of Madison and Washington); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-1301 (the Fifth 
Judicial District, which consists of the counties of Franklin, Johnson, and Pope); ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 16-13-1401 (the Sixth Judicial District, which consists of the counties of Pulaski and 
Perry); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-3101(b) (the Seventh Judicial District, which consists of the 
counties of Grant and Hot Spring); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-3201(a) (the Eighth Judicial 
District–North, which consists of the counties of Hempstead and Nevada); ARK. CODE ANN. § 
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and it is doubtful that any of those persons would readily cede any of their 
prerogatives or autonomy to another elected official.61 
Second, authorizing the Attorney General to grant a person immunity 
from criminal prosecution would require amending the Constitution of the 
State of Arkansas because the Twenty-first Amendment of the State’s char-
ter vests the authority to prosecute criminal cases with prosecuting attor-
neys.62 Amending the State’s Constitution requires a majority vote in the 
State House of Representatives and the State Senate to present the proposed 
amendment to the voters, and a majority vote of the voters at the next gen-
eral election following the votes in the House and the Senate.63 
There are no doubt other reasons why empowering the Attorney Gen-
eral to grant a person immunity from criminal prosecution is fraught with 
procedural, political, and substantive challenges. If, however, one agrees 
that the DTPA as it is currently written poses serious Fifth Amendment 
problems, and one also agrees that it would be more prudent for the State to 
cure those problems before a constitutional challenge is filed in a court, re-
pealing section 4-88-103 is the soundest course of action. 
 
16-13-3201(b) (the Eighth Judicial District–South, which consists of the counties of Lafa-
yette and Miller); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-1701(a) (the Ninth Judicial District–East, which 
consists of Clark County); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-1701(b) (the Ninth Judicial District–
West, which consists of the counties of Howard, Little River, Sevier, and Pike); ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 16-13-1801 (the Tenth Judicial District, which consists of the counties of Ashley, 
Bradley, Chicot, Desha, and Drew); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-1901(a) (the Eleventh Judicial 
District–East, which consists of Arkansas County); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-1901(b) (the 
Eleventh Judicial District–West, which consists of the counties of Jefferson and Lincoln); 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-2001 (the Twelfth Judicial District, which consists of Sebastian 
County); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-2101 (the Thirteenth Judicial District, which consists of 
the counties of Calhoun, Cleveland, Columbia, Dallas, Ouachita, and Union); ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 16-13-2201 (the Fourteenth Judicial District, which consists of the counties of Baxter, 
Boone, Marion, and Newton); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-2301 (the Fifteenth Judicial District, 
which consists of the counties of Conway, Logan, Scott, and Yell); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-
2401 (the Sixteenth Judicial District, which consists of the counties of Cleburne, Fulton, 
Independence, Izard, and Stone); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-2501(a) (the Seventeenth Judicial 
District, which consists of the counties of Prairie and White); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-
2601(a) (the Eighteenth Judicial District–East, which consists of Garland County); ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 16-13-2601(b) (the Eighteenth Judicial District–West, which consists of the 
counties of Montgomery and Polk); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-2701 (the Nineteenth Judicial 
District, which consists of the counties of Benton and Carroll); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-
2801 (the Twentieth Judicial District, which consists of the counties of Faulkner, Searcy, and 
Van Buren); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-2901 (the Twenty-First Judicial District, which con-
sists of Crawford County); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-3101(a) (the Twenty-Second Judicial 
District, which consists of Saline County); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-2501(b) (the Twenty-
Third Judicial District, which consists of Lonoke County). 
 61. ARK. CONST. art. VI, § 3. 
 62. ARK. CONST. amend. 21, § 1. 
 63. ARK. CONST. art. XIX, § 22. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
The government can compel self-incriminating testimony only if the 
witness is granted immunity before giving the testimony.64 Under the DTPA, 
the Attorney General can compel a person to give non-immunized self-
incriminating testimony in DTPA investigations.65 This is contrary to well 
established Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, and it is unconstitutional.66 The 
State can and should cure this constitutional defect by repealing section 4-
88-103. That, however, is unlikely to happen for a number of reasons. 
First, someone reading this paper may very well conclude that its cen-
tral premise is wrong, its legal analysis is wrong, or both. Second, repealing 
a statute that criminalizes deceptive trade practices may be unpopular in a 
state as politically conservative as Arkansas.67 It could be difficult for a leg-
islator to explain to his or her constituents that decriminalizing something as 
ominous sounding as “deceptive trade practices” is an exercise of good gov-
ernment. Third, more than forty years have passed since the General As-
sembly authorized the Attorney General to compel non-immunized self-
incriminating testimony in DTPA investigations, and no reported case exists 
where the target of such an investigation has challenged the constitutionality 
of that authority. Moreover, there is no reported case where a person has 
 
 64. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 78 (1973) (citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 
U.S. 441, 443–59 (1972)). 
 65. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-88-111(a)(1)-(2), 4-88-112. 
 66. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 770–71 (2003) (citing Maness v. Myers, 419 U.S. 
449, 461–62 (1975); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972)). 
 67. The Republican nominee for President of the United States of America has won 
Arkansas’s six electoral votes in the last four consecutive elections, and in each election since 
2000, the Republican nominee received a greater percentage of Arkansas’s popular vote than 
his predecessor. In 2000, George Walker Bush received 472,940 votes (51.31%), and Albert 
Gore, Jr. received 422,768 votes (45.86%). 2000 Presidential Election, U.S. ELECTORAL C., 
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/2000/popular_vote.html (last visit-
ed Sept. 29, 2014). In 2004, George Walker Bush received 572,770 votes (54.36%), and John 
Kerry received 468,631 votes (44.48%). 2004 Presidential Election, U.S. ELECTORAL C., 
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/2004/popular_vote.html (last visit-
ed Sept. 29, 2014). In 2008, John McCain received 638,017 votes (58.72%), and Barack 
Obama received 422,310 votes (38.86%). 2008 Presidential Election, U.S. ELECTORAL C., 
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/2008/popular-vote.html (last visit-
ed Sept. 29, 2014). In 2012, Willard Mitt Romney received 647,744 votes (60.57%), and 
Barack Obama received 394,049 votes (36.88%). 2012 Presidential Election, U.S. 
ELECTORAL C., http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/2012/popular-vote.
html (last visited Sept. 29, 2014). As of this writing, the 100 member Arkansas House of 
Representatives has 51 Republicans, 48 Democrats, and 1 member of the Green Party. About 
the House, ARK. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, www.arkansashouse.org/about-the-house (last 
visited Sept. 29, 2014). The 35 member Arkansas Senate has 21 Republicans and 14 Demo-
crats. About the Arkansas Senate, ARK. SENATE, www.arkansas.gov/senate/senators.html (last 
visited Sept. 29, 2014). 
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been prosecuted under section 4-88-103. One could therefore argue that 
section 4-88-103 has fallen into desuetude,68 rendering legislative repeal 
unnecessary. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing reasons for legislative inaction, section 
4-88-103 should still be repealed. Persons elected to the General Assembly 
are not there to do only what is popular. If a state official is legislatively 
empowered to act in a way that is contrary to the Federal Constitution, the 
General Assembly should abrogate that power, even if doing so would not 
sit well with the populace. Also, courts rarely accept the argument that a 
criminal statute is unconstitutional because it has been infrequently enforced 
or not enforced at all, therefore, the General Assembly should not rely on 
the doctrine of desuetude to do its work for it.69 Last, if someone mounted a 
constitutional challenge to section 4-88-103 and prevailed, the State could 
be liable for that person’s costs and attorneys’ fees.70 If there is one thing 
that a legislator does not want to have to explain to his or her constituents, it 
is why the taxpayers had to pay the attorneys of a private party in a lawsuit 
that the state lost. 
In sum, repealing section 4-88-103 would be an exercise of proactive 
and prudent government. 
 
 68. The doctrine of desuetude says that a statute can be abrogated by reason of its long 
and continued non-use. See United States v. Elliot, 266 F. Supp. 318, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); 
See also State v. Legrand, 129 Conn. App. 239, 272–75, 20 A.3d 52, 73–74 (2011). 
 69. Comm. on Legal Ethics of the W. Va. State Bar v. Printz, 187 W. Va. 182, 186–89, 
416 S.E.2d 720, 724–27 (1992) (Desuetude is seldom used and is not a “judicial repeal provi-
sion that abrogates any criminal statute that has not been used in ‘X’ years.”). Ironically, the 
Printz Court found West Virginia Code section 61-5-19 (1923) void under the doctrine of 
desuetude. Id. at 189. The statute invalidated in Printz prohibited a person from making an 
offer not to prosecute a crime in exchange for the return of funds lost due to a crime. Id. at 
186. No one had been prosecuted under § 61-5-19 since 1938 (fifty-four years at the time of 
Printz). Id. at 189. 
 70. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). This statute authorizes a court to award the prevailing party his 
costs and attorneys’ fees in cases enforcing 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is the statute used to 
litigate claims arising under the Federal Constitution. 
